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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XLIX, NO. 1: JANUARY 3, 1952

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PUBLISHED FORTNIGHTLY

BY THE

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, INC.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

FOUNDED BY FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE AND WENDELL T. BUSH

EDITORS: Herbert W. Schneider, John H. Randall, Jr., Ernest Nagel.

MANAGING EDITOR: Emerson Buchanan.

Communications to the editors should be addressed to the Managing Editor, 515 West 116th Street, New York 27, N. Y. Subscriptions and advertisements should be sent to THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Prince and Lemon Streets, Lancaster, Pa., or 515 West 116th Street, New York 27, N. Y. The annual subcription price (twenty-six numbers) is $5.00. The price of single numbers is 30 cents, double numbers, 60 cents.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY is owned by the Journal of Philosophy, Inc., and published fortnightly at Prince and Lemon Sts., Lancaster, Pa. Editorial Office: 515 West 116th St., New York 27, N. Y. President, Ernest Nagel; Vice President, Herbert W. Schneider; Treasurer, Frederick A. Dewey; Secretary, Iris Wilder Dean.

Entered as second class matter, March 18, 1921, at the Post Office at Lancaster, Pa., under Act of Congress of March 3, 1879.

PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Edited by

MARVIN FARBER

in cooperation with

A DISTINGUISHED GROUP OF AMERICAN AND FOREIGN SCHOLARS

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Published by the

UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO

Buffalo 14, New York

Subscription price: Five Dollars per year

A descriptive circular listing the main contents of each number since the journal's foundation in September, 1940, may be obtained upon request.

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VOLUME XLIX

JANUARY—DECEMBER, 1952

1952

LANCASTER PRESS, INC., LANCASTER, PA.

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VOLUME XLIX, No. 1 JANUARY 3, 1952

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

PLAUSIBILITY IN FICTION[1]

PLAUSIBILITY is Sancho Panza to the theory of probability; it is also an elementary aspect of fiction writing and a significant problem in criticism. Techniques of writing plausibly have been discussed. But the analysis of plausibility in fiction—the explication of its nature and of the relations between it and other phenomena of imagination and intellect—seems to be unbroken soil.

Imagination is important not only because it enters into illusion and the sense of plausibility. Even at the level of common sense, we note a difference between the thing and "the thing imagined," or the thing "in mind" and "thought about." While you and I are in the study, I can meaningfully ask you to "think of" the yellow cups hanging in the kitchen. Imagining the cups would then be said to take place in the study, not in the kitchen. But even if we are looking directly at the cups, we really *see* only part of the surface, and we *imagine* the other side and the bottom, and perhaps the weight empty and the weight full and the use of them. Across the room from those real ones, imagination pours a potfull into the perceived cups. A creature which could see, but could not imagine, would see not a solid world of bodies, but merely, as Berkeley put it, "various colours variously disposed."[2] Or, as Rousseau said, "Without false appearances, we could not see anything in the distance. . . . if we saw all the dimensions of objects in their true measure, we should not see any space, and everything would appear on our eye."[3] Less possibility of error is involved in asserting that the perceived cups are in our mind than in saying that the real cups are in the kitchen.

On the stage, of course, the matter is much more intricate and complex. Yellow cups in the theatre may be made of papier-maché. The actors may merely suggest them by words or gestures. In a

[1] Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, at the University of British Columbia, September 6, 1951. Some minor changes have been made.

[2] Paraphrased from R. G. Collingwood: *The Principles of Art*, Oxford, 1938 and 1950, p. 192.

[3] *Émile*, Vol. 3 in *Oeuvres Complètes de J. J. Rousseau*, ed. V. D. Musset-Pathay, Paris, Dupont, 1823, p. 231.

good play well acted, in any case, they will be plausible and "realistic," though we are imagining them as far away as seventeenth-century Tasmania.

The relations which exist between the realm of reality and the realm of imagination are of utmost practical importance. To quote Rousseau again, "The real world has its limits, the world of imagination is infinite: if not able to enlarge the one, let us control the other; from the difference between them arise all the pains which render us truly miserable."[4] "We barely commiserate the dray-horse in his stable, because we do not suppose that while eating his hay he is thinking of the hard blows which he has received or of the fatiguing work which awaits him."[5] The physical sense of pain is limited; but memory and imagination—regret and anticipation—fit man for pity.

The demand for plausibility is such a demand for control of imagination. Since the time of Rousseau, however, the limits of the real world confine practice less and less. And this consideration invites a comparison of plausibility in fiction with its counterpart in scientific prediction and practical foresight.

By a vulgar ellipsis, we ordinarily think of our hypotheses about objective events and realities as being directly confirmed by presentations of sense. Neither in the case of scientific prediction nor of everyday foresight is this true. Indirectly, presentations of sense do confirm objective things; but what they directly confirm, simply by matching them, are images. "Anticipated sensations" are not sensations at all; they are images, or what Hume called "ideas." Recognition of empirical truth or falsehood depends on the relation between a projected image and a sensum: if the sensum turns out to be like the expected image, the objective thing or event is confirmed. To be more exact, prediction consists in projecting images and runs of images; confirmation consists in finding, by the prescribed route, a flux of sensory experience which matches them.

The *plausibility* of a hypothesis is perhaps nothing more than a general feeling associated with an estimating by intellect of the hypothesis' antecedent probability.[6] In any case, the plausibility

[4] *Ibid*, pp. 99–100.

[5] *Ibid*, p. 410.

[6] "By plausible, I mean that a theory that has not yet been subjected to any test, although more or less surprising phenomena have occurred which it would explain if it were true, is in itself of such a character as to recommend it for further examination or, if it be *highly* plausible, justify us in seriously inclining toward belief in it, as long as the phenomena be inexplicable other-

of a hypothesis must differ in degree from the plausibility of a story, in that the former depends on data more easily traceable and more directly relevant to presentations of sense. Moreover, in the logic of confirmation of hypotheses, as stated by Williams,[7] "the less likely a datum is to occur anyhow, regardless of whether the hypothesis is true, the more probable the hypothesis as a result of the datum." "Evidence supports a hypothesis to the extent that it is surprising without the hypothesis." A hypothesis in mind wants confirming in a flux of sensation predicted exclusively or most economically by the hypothesis. So the demand for plausibility is *less* exacting in science and practical life than in fiction, since the creative writer has no laboratory in which to reveal surprising truths. He must avoid the *deus ex machina* like poison. The writer knows better than anyone that "truth is stranger than fiction."

In stories we deal not in sensa and sensation but only in images. To be sure, there is sensory experience in the theatre, but it is symbolic only; otherwise plays could not be read as well as heard and seen. Symbols and images in fiction cannot be compared with sensa for confirmation; hence all satisfaction in reading fiction must depend on our feeling that what we are reading is generally plausible. The audience must "dream," ". . . while the artist oversees the conditions which determine this dream."[8] A legitimate demand for "confirmation" cannot concern the images, but only the *way* in which they are arrayed; it must concern, in other words, the order among the symbols.

The banality that the events narrated in a work of fiction do not occur actually and materially has aligned writers with liars. In fact, the difference between falsehood and fiction is all to the advantage of those telling real falsehoods. A liar deceives someone who does not know that he is being deceived. A writer must "deceive" a fussy collaborator who knows that it is all a fake. Hence successful authors are much rarer than successful liars; except perhaps among Irishmen, who may really excel in both fields.

Yet in good fiction we are looking for something which is plausible not in the sense of "specious" but in the sense of "fair-spoken." The angling author carries the burden of responsibility placed upon him by Aristotle: that ". . . poetry is something more

wise." *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Harvard University Press, 1932, Vol. II, paragraph 662.

[7] From mimeographed notes of Donald C. Williams dated 1947.

[8] Kenneth Burke: *Counter-Statement*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1931, p. 47.

philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars."[9]

Plausibility in the sense of "fair-spokenness" depends, first of all, on so-called internal consistency. The author has a serf-like half-freedom in choosing his premises and constructing his imaginary world. It would be imperceptive, for example, to berate Dostoievski on the ground that no Russian woman behaves like Nastasya Filippovna. But a fiction really is marred, if the least event in it is inconsistent with its *own* basic premises. Animals can talk southern dialect, but then they must behave like human beings —and not like damn Yankees. Since the animals really are our cousins, it is possible to assume their point of view realistically, too, but not *per impossibile*. The wounded lion in Hemingway's "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber" is an example of the limiting case. I shall mention just a few subsidiary restrictions. Whatever characters may do, they must do it consistently with *their* own premises; "even if inconsistency be part of the man . . , he should still be consistently inconsistent."[10] Secondly, the characters must know nothing which the point of view ascribed to them by the author does not permit of their knowing. And thirdly, the reader must not be told anything which the point of view taken up by the author himself does not allow the reader to find out.

Enough to show that the demand for internal consistency is exigent! Internal consistency alone, however, does not suffice to make a story plausible. The author is using symbols to elicit a certain run of imagery. To be plausible, the temporal sequence among such imaginary events must be intellectually satisfying in the light of the reader's inductive knowledge about the world. That is, fiction makes an external reference. *Plausibility consists in the subsumption of fictional events under laws of nature;* and since the subject matter of fiction is for the most part human action and character, *the relevant laws are mostly laws of human nature and laws of the formation of character.*

Of such laws, of course, little enough is explicitly known; that lack of explicitness, however, does not prevent our defining in terms of them. The point is that, no matter how difficult the explication of them may be, the laws really are exemplified, and tacitly recognized by the perceptive reader, in good fiction. In this connection, the conclusion of Brooks and Warren is commendable that

[9] Aristotle: *Poetics*, 1451b. Quoted from *The Student's Oxford Aristotle.*
[10] *Ibid.*, 1454a.

> . . . the underlying significance of all fiction may be the faith of the writer that experience itself is significant and is not a mere flux of unrelated items.[11]

Moreover, of course, the reader must learn something new. Literature catering to those of little knowledge and less curiosity is classed as stereotype. As George R. Stewart points out, traditional notions of cause and effect in motivation and human relations are of little use to an author. The author's task is to discover and invent, and then to take advantage of whatever plasticity there may be in the reader's sense of plausibility. In fact, part of an author's originality and flavor consists precisely in his individual conception and treatment of plausibility: witness Stendhal and Dostoievski. In rare cases the author can even get away with postulating an impossible premise, as Kafka does in "Metamorphosis." The legitimate expectation of plausibility in such cases is reduced to the form of the conditional. "If the impossible event did occur, would the results narrated follow in a world pretty much like ours?" Only a genius in the affirming of consequents can postulate an absurdity and still make a tale plausible; and even then, readers with parochial imagination will reject the story, saying that it is "impossible." But generally speaking, the assertion of Kant holds even of plausibility, that

> All stiff regularity . . . is inherently repugnant to taste, in that the contemplation of it affords us no lasting entertainment. . . . On the other hand, anything that gives the imagination scope for unstudied and final play is always fresh to us.[12]

Aristotle is essentially correct, in respect to plausibility, in asserting that literature is imitation. Human character and action are imitated. He is also right in saying that we can learn through such imitation, and that it is natural for us to delight in such learning.[13]

At the same time, however, Wilde's dictum that "Art imitates life less than life imitates art" is not too far-fetched in this context. For when once a paradigm has been fictionally presented, imagination may adopt, and through its adoption actualize, what before was merely potential in human nature. A famous instance of such imitation of a fictional character was the sudden emergence of thousands of Eugène Rastignacs after Balzac published *Le Père Goriot*.

[11] Cleanth Brooks, Jr., and Robert Penn Warren: *Understanding Fiction*, New York, Crofts, 1943, p. 600.

[12] *Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*, trans. by J. C. Meredith, Oxford, 1911, p. 88.

[13] Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 1448b.

Aristotle affirms truly but far too baldly that the characters in a tragedy are necessarily either good men or bad.[14] Good works of fiction are subtler: in them one discovers the complexities of human nature, including above all the secret recesses of his own; and so one is helped to advance from a continuous *passio* to a continuous *actio*. That is, perhaps, one reason why Spinoza said that all men should go to the theatre. There is in fact good reason to believe that Spinoza's orientation in philosophy was in large part determined by his recognition that the puritans were blind to their *own* passions and corrupt consciousness.[15]

Given a modicum of psychic distance, the member of an audience is in the fortunate position of a man who is conscious, for example, of his own anger; that is, of one who not simply feels anger but is aware of anger and of himself as feeling it. The member of an audience is even more fortunate, for his imagination can play with feelings which by hypothesis do *not* belong to him other than imaginatively. Thus, in a plausible fiction, the spectator is able to learn sympathetically—in the broad sense—some of the best, and some of the worst, human feelings. This really is learning, and not just empathy, or the imaginative projection of one's own consciousness into another being. The process is the opposite of empathy: it is the imaginative internalizing, or subjectifying, into one's self of the supposed feelings of a fictional character. Such learning is through exemplars, and hence easy. The names of many famous exemplars of this sort have entered into our vocabulary. "Romeo," "Hamlet," "Laertes," "Simon Legree," and "Scrooge" are words listed in *Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*.

Good fiction reveals permanent possibilities in the spheres of individual feeling and action and of social behavior. Whoever recalls John Stuart Mill's abortive efforts to establish a science of ethology will see that his "science" lies implicit in novels and drama.[16] The poetic insights of Dostoievski and Nietzsche turn out to be facts of psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, contemporary philosophers and psychologists have tended to neglect the areas of feeling and ethology. Not the least negligent have been followers of Hume, who himself wrote a treatise in three parts on human nature. Perhaps literature is still the most plausible place in which to learn about people. For books of fiction are plausible, only if the events narrated in them are consistent with the facts of human nature and of the formation of character.

ROBERT T. HARRIS

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[14] *Ibid.*, 1448a.

[15] Compare Collingwood, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

[16] J. S. Mill: *A System of Logic*, Bk. VI, Chs. 3, 4, 5.

BOOK REVIEWS

Science and Common Sense. JAMES B. CONANT. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1951. xii, 371 pp. $4.00.

This book is written by a scientist for the purpose of explaining science to the layman. Without any condescension, indeed modestly, the writer conveys various meaty truths to the reader in untechnical language. The writer's method is *not* primarily to give a summary of facts and laws, not to provide scientific information; it is rather to present the "strategy and tactics" of science. He concentrates on some of the decisive battles—for instance the problem of atmospheric pressure, of combustion, of fermentation, the development of the atomic theory, etc.—and shows how the scientists fought these battles. The author's military vocabulary should not be taken to imply that he exhibits science as a continuous advance to some overall victory. There are particular victories, to be sure; there are also defeats; and the defeats are as instructive as the victories.

The reader of this book has the vivid sense of being taken behind the scenes and of witnessing science in the making, rather than as something finished and neat. The author's approach is descriptive and phenomenological; he is like an anthropologist, reporting on the intellectual *mores*, the patterns of behavior of the scientific tribe.

But there are many factual details too, so that on the whole a great deal of information is conveyed to the reader. The author's attention is directed primarily to the earlier stages in the growth of science; thus, there is nothing on Copernicus and Newton, and very little on Darwin. There is merit in this approach; science in its infancy is simpler, its problems can be isolated more easily and can be grasped better.

I am not competent to judge the book on the scientific side. Yet, as a layman—a patient, so to say, who has received the treatment—I heartily recommend the book to my fellow-laymen as most readable and clear, firm in its assertions yet unpretentious, vigorous in its thinking yet informal in exposition, and often wise. I can also recommend it to my fellow-philosophers. Mr. Conant is known to the public as a scientist and as an educational statesman, but this book reveals him as a careful thinker on philosophical matters connected with science—and also on some problems going beyond science. His position might be described as modified pragmatism, and in this review I will restrict myself to the philosophical aspects of the book.

Mr. Conant will have none of the current idolatry of science. He brings science down to earth, yet without debunking it. Science, he tells us, is not the whole of knowledge. Besides science, which is accumulative knowledge, there are philosophy and parts of social studies, which are non-accumulative knowledge. The reader of the review must make a special note of this point; because of his kind of empiricism, Mr. Conant might be mistaken for a logical positivist. Yet, unlike the latter, he does not restrict knowledge to the statements of science. Within the field of science itself, it emerges from Mr. Conant's account that science is not quite an impartial survey of the facts. The layman is apt to think of science as an exercise of the pure and unbiased intellect, and of scientific results as having a complete authority. The reader of this book will discover that scientists are not without bias or even without emotions in reaching conclusions. Some of the controversies in which Pasteur engaged were a clash as much of men as they were of ideas. The courage or the timidity of the scientist, his prejudices and also mere accident are part of the picture. A scientist will approach a new phenomenon armed with many preconceptions of which he is often unconscious. An old conceptual scheme that has outlived its usefulness will nevertheless persist if there be no new conceptual scheme to take its place. Finally, there is no such thing, we are told, as *the* scientific method, no set formula for scientific procedure.

As the author points out, there have been, in the middle ages and later, large though vague speculations about the facts while, at the same time but from the other end, there has been a continuous tradition of careful observation by artisans. Although neither of these in science, yet each represents a tendency necessary for science. Science may be viewed "as an attempt either to lower the degree of empiricism or to extend the range of theory" (p. 58). Speculative schemes must be linked deductively with observation; and observation must be carried on in the light of theory. The author makes a very impressive use indeed of his conception that scientific advance consists in the *lowering of the degree of empiricism*. It is not merely that experience should be carried out in the light of a theory; it is the general doctrine that science must not be confused with information, with *reportage*, with an array of facts, but that it consists in the harnessing of observed data to a conceptual scheme. The author defines science as "an interconnected series of concepts and conceptual schemes that have developed as a result of experimentation and observation and are fruitful of further experimentation and observations" (p. 44). Science is not mere explanation of what is present; it is prediction of

the future. But neither is prediction enough; there must be movement to further experiments and theories. What is novel in this definition is that science is a continuing and unending operation. If the process stopped it would cease being science; it would be doctrine or even dogma. Is the ongoingness of science an intrinsic property, in the sense in which any living thing changes so long as it lives? Or is the ongoingness of science due to the contingent fact that there is a stream of new sense-material emerging constantly from the future? I think the author means the latter, although I am not sure. Science is, so to speak, an "open" system in which questions are never finally settled. "Science is not a quest for certainty" (p. 26). Scientific theories are inevitably provisional and corrigible.

From this conclusion as a premise, the author proceeds to some very audacious and striking statements. Given the fact that theories are devised to account for and predict empirical observations, it follows that the concept of a reality beyond appearance is irrelevant to science. And since every theory which is verified today may be falsified tomorrow, the notion of truth has no application in science. Where William James (to whom the author refers with respect) defined truth in terms of predictive consequences, Mr. Conant eliminates the notion of truth altogether, so far as scientific *conceptual schemes* are concerned. Science is not an attempt to depict the *nature* of things; in fact, the idea that phenomena have any particular "nature" is wholly gratuitous. All we know in science is that at a given time a certain account is adequate for the phenomena and later a different account. In fact, it may happen that *at one and the same time,* contradictory accounts of the phenomena must be maintained. The author makes his point by a very interesting example from optical science. The question had been posed as to the nature of light. Some optical phenomena can be explained only by a corpuscular theory, others only by a wave theory. The ordinary man will ask: What is light *really?* To this the author replies: Such a question has no meaning. "The conceptual scheme which accommodates all the known official phenomena satisfactorily (and has done so for several decades) is one in which a corpuscular picture fits one set of experiments, a wave theory certain others; *no experiment can be envisaged that will answer a question which was once thought of prime significance,* namely, *is light really corpuscular or undulatory in nature?*" (p. 29). Thus light is both corpuscular and undulatory, according to the particular set of phenomena to which one is referring; and if the objection be made that such a statement violates the law of

contradiction, I think the author would reply that this law is not involved since no truth is claimed for scientific propositions.

Again, for the man of common sense this object is a table or a lamp, whereas for the scientist the same object is a collection of atoms, protons, etc. Now, it is not the case that the scientific account supersedes the other picture; both are valid in relation to their different purposes. I suggest that there is a possible embarrassment here. In the course of his inquiry, the scientist makes use of instruments like watches, barometers, and telescopes; and in using these, he takes them to be real as common-sense objects are real. So far forth, science operates both on the scientific and the common-sense levels.

To the reviewer it looks as though the author is applying Occam's razor to traditional concepts with almost complete abandon —no ulterior reality, no fixed and eternal truth, no nature of things, no determinate order in phenomena. Yet it should be remarked that the author does not advance his denials because of an adherence to any *general principle* of empiricism. He has no *a priori* theory of meaning; in the widest sense of the word he is empirical, in that he construes his sense of meaning differently according to the necessities of the situation and in an *ad hoc* fashion. Neither philosophical nor religious assertions are tested in the scientific way.

Science is not exhausted by its fluid aspects; there is also a fixed element constituted by certain non-empirical assumptions, like the belief in other minds, in the trustworthiness of memory, and in the uniformity of nature—assumptions which it shares with common sense. But in science, the uniformity of nature is taken to mean that "under the same set of conditions, the phenomena are in all details reproducible. Such assumptions may be regarded as an act of faith" (p. 35).

Unlike contemporary naturalists who establish a metaphysical position on the basis of scientific statements, Mr. Conant finds no ontological significance in science. Surely this is going too far. It is one thing to show that somebody has feet of clay; it is another thing to go on and maintain that, whether made of clay or of flesh, the feet of science stand on no ground whatever. In denying that science reveals any truth, is not the author opening the gates to all the winds of authoritarianism and obscurantism? If you can not find the truth in science, then you will look for it in dogma—Catholic, Marxian, or any other authoritarian (or perhaps intuitively arrived at) system of belief.

Mr. Conant is not unaware of these pitfalls. His answer is that there is no escape from the requirement of evidence *anywhere*.

The escapist from science can not take refuge in the security of philosophy or religion, because these also provide no more than tentative conceptual schemes, subject to *their* data.

Mr. Conant suggests that science in no way closes the door to religion. Science deals with and accounts for sensory phenomena, whereas religion is concerned to provide a theory for the phenomena of personal emotion. The theories of religion are just as valid for its data as are those of science for its own. In other words, as there may be equally valid, though contradictory, theories about light, so there may be theories of a larger scope which are contradictory and yet equally valid. To the reviewer it seems that Mr. Conant is saying: You are rationally justified in believing that God exists and you are rationally justified in believing that God does not exist at the same time. I demur that such believing is not only psychologically impossible but is hardly respectable. Such a pragmatic pluralism verges on intellectual polygamy. Granted, for the sake of argument, that truth is not all of a piece in science, does it follow that such is the case with philosophy, too? The author's own asserted position is that the scientific canon has no authority outside science. And I would add that, unlike science, philosophy is completely unlimited in its generalizations; it purports to account for all the phenomena—the data of science, religion, art, the moral life, and so on. And if so, the reservation that one philosophical theory is to be permitted for one range of data, and a *different* philosophical theory for another, can not be valid.

But to return to science. It is clear that in defining science in terms of conceptual schemes relevant for prediction, the author is drawing heavily on physics and chemistry. Thus he is severely critical of biological science with its emphasis on classification and systematization. Biology falls short of the scientific ideal in that it makes no appeal to broad conceptual schemes. It does not take its classifications as tentative theories; it takes them as true descriptions. To quote: "Emphasis on science as systematized knowledge seems unfortunate. Not that such knowledge is not part of the fabric of science, but it is not its *essence* [Italics mine]. . . . only to the degree that new *ideas* are introduced into the systematization of factual information does its activity partake of the nature of the work of those investigators we readily identify as 'great scientists' " (pp. 219–220).

Now, all this is very curious; it is wrong to speak of the "essence" of light but right to speak of the "essence" of science. Socrates used to ask: What is virtue? Mr. Conant asks, What is science? and seems to imply that there is a real pattern to be dis-

cerned which governs the activity of scientists in various fields. As Socrates rebuked the public for mistaking superficial and temporary characteristics for permanent ones, so does Mr. Conant rebuke the biologists in a similar vein. The author is no longer the anthropologist of scientific behavior; he is a moralist passing normative judgments (as when he construes the activity of "great scientists" as a standard for other scientists). It would also appear that he has abandoned his empiricism. For his definition of science is not an inductive generalization from the *facts* of scientific behavior since, as he tells us, scientists like biologists do not, in fact, behave in that fashion.

I am not, however, suggesting that, like Socrates, the author has obtained his definition from "rational insight." Mr. Conant might reply that, in passing a normative judgment on the procedures of the biologists, he is appealing to their own aims. What he is doing is to show that the means which they adopt will not accomplish the ends they desire. Yes, to be sure—but how are we (as empiricists) to discover the aims of the biologists except through their practices? Would the author distinguish between somebody's *real* aims and his *apparent* aims? But aside from all these considerations, I suggest that science is better conceived not as a single sort of thing but as a spectrum, at one end of which would be physics and chemistry, rich in conceptual schemes but weak in description, and at the other end, history and geology, which provide descriptions of what has happened but are poorer in conceptual schemes. Biology with its classifications would come in between. Surely it is wrong to put science in a strait jacket. Let each variety of science operate freely, developing its rules in accordance with the needs of its special subject matter. This is more in accordance with the empirical temper and the open mind.

I am omitting all reference to a great deal of interesting and stimulating detail that is found in the book under review. For instance, I am saying nothing of the author's discussion of the historical origins of the scientific spirit (he refers to Petrarch, Erasmus, Montaigne, and others), of the role of professional societies in the growth of science, of the relation of pure to applied science, of the role of the uncommitted investigator, and so on; and I am proceeding to a discussion and a criticism of the author's interpretation of science. Mr. Conant may be described as a phenomenalist and a relativist as to science. Science proceeds from the past and present phenomena to a prediction of the unending procession of sensations in the future—a procession in which no fixed unitary pattern is to be found. Rather the endless procession

is a phantasmagoria. Now, the assumed premise of phenomenalism is that reference is determined by evidence; that a concept can refer only to that which verifies it. This assumption is, I submit, wholly gratuitous; reference and evidence are distinct operations, not necessarily having identical terms. To argue that the mind is concerned with phenomena just because it is observing and recording them, is like arguing that a person reading a book is concerned with the printed signs because that is what he is looking at and that is how he obtains and verifies his meanings.

Mr. Conant is an empiricist about the meaning of common-sense ideas as well as scientific ones; to say that a physical object exists is to make predictions of empirical data. Let us see. The proposition "There is an inkpot on the table" would mean, I suppose: "Stretch out your arm and you will experience a particular sort of touch." Well, supposing it is dark, and while I am putting out my hand, the sleight-of-hand artist puts a cylinder around the inkpot, or even removes the inkpot from the table. My prediction was disconfirmed but it does not follow that the inkpot wasn't there. That is because we had not sufficiently qualified our empirical prediction. We should have said "I will feel a sense of touch when I put out my arm *provided* nobody interposes a cylinder, etc., etc." But I submit that the qualifications are of an indefinite number and it is absurd to suppose that I have all these in mind when I make the simple statement "The inkpot is on the table." We might simplify matters enormously by saying that the prediction would be confirmed if tested under *normal* conditions. But what is meant by normal conditions save those under which I would perceive an inkpot on the table? In short, the meaning of inkpot is plain "inkpot" in the realistic sense.

It is wrong to argue to common-sense meanings of reality from the scientific meanings. Wrong, I mean, from the standpoint of the empirical premise. Assuming even that in science the notion of reality is defined operationally, or defined as consistency among data or agreement among observers, in no way does it follow that this is the way common sense thinks of reality. For the pragmatist, science and common sense have different purposes and hence get at their meanings differently. Parents will recall how, when telling a story to a child, they have been interrupted by the child asking: "Is this a story or is it true (real)?" The child makes an ultimate distinction between fantasy and reality. Also in common sense we have the concept of pretending or acting. We can conceive of a person being such a good actor—in his daily conduct, I mean—that he might never be discovered. Here again common sense makes

an ultimate distinction between reality and appearance; reality need not be that which appears in experience.

I would go further and defend the view that a scientific theory, too, purports to state what is the case, that science is an attempt to provide a map or portrait of the real constitution of the real universe. Since not all the evidence is available at once, a scientific account is an abstraction (in Whitehead's sense)—not complete, yet certainly not a construction. The fact that conceptual schemes are always corrigible may just as well be explained by the fact that never at any moment is the evidence all in. Scientific theories through time should form a series of increasing approximation to the truth. When, as in the case of optical phenomena, we are compelled to adopt diametrically opposed theories, it is because our observations are fragmentary. In our efforts to understand the phenomena, we must press in several directions at once. In order to catch the fish, we must throw the net down at different places. Yet the hope is that, as more phenomena are discovered, and also as more refined or broader conceptual tools are devised, we shall arrive at a more consistent account. If this be an act of faith, it is no different from the belief in the uniformity of nature, a belief which Mr. Conant recognizes as an act of faith. But perhaps Mr. Conant will reply that while the second is necessary, the first is superfluous in science. Let us be thrifty and prudent in our faiths. Quite so; but is it true that science can dispense with the notions of reality, or of a true or false account of things, or of an objective order or pattern?

On the author's view, science is a self-enclosed, self-perpetuating, and self-consuming mental activity—theories suggested by observation and experiment, then new experiments solely devised with a view to the testing of the theory, then still more theories. This is blind activism: action and then more action; a sort of restless Faustian dynamism. Perhaps the activism can be redeemed from meaninglessness if construed as a game—say a sport like mountaineering. But surely such a view would fail to account for the sense of seriousness that a scientist has about his enterprise. If I be told that games like chess playing and sports like mountain climbing are often approached with the greatest seriousness, I would still insist that the attitudes are different. Suppose, for instance, that scientists did believe that (pure) science is a sport; then I would predict that the zest of the scientist will cool off and that science itself may wither.

Moreover rules in sports are arbitrary; and the football coaches change some of the rules of their game every year. The Polynesian native gives a magical and animistic interpretation of phenomena;

his rules of evidence vary from those of the scientist. Since rules in games are matters of convention, why isn't the Polynesian's game as good as the scientist's? You might answer: Yes, but still it isn't science. Maybe, but why isn't it knowledge? Unless we recognize an objective structure by which to check the accuracy of the conceptual scheme, we are compelled to admit that magic is no more superstition, no less valid than science is.

Whether or not the notion of reality is necessary at the level of scientific knowledge, it must be invoked, I submit, at the level of the philosophy of science. In the book before us, the author is talking science but he is practicing philosophy. The business of "understanding science" (the author's phrase for his task) is not science but meta-science (the literal meaning of the word metaphysics). Call it philosophy, which is non-accumulative knowledge. The account of science provided by the author surely is not a scientific theory, for it makes no predictions and calls for no experiment. Moreover, the author offers his view as a "true" account of science.

Yet, at the level of meta-science, explanation of the facts is just as necessary as it is for science. The problems of the philosophy of science begin where science leaves off. Some of these problems are as follows: We have the fact that different minds agree in their observations, the fact that, on the whole, predictions are fulfilled, the fact that scientific theories work successfully in their practical applications. We have the further fact that the assumption of the uniformity of science is being increasingly confirmed. Now, the author simply reports these as facts to be noted, without trying to account for them; but then he is violating his own canon in favor of lowering the degree of empiricism—a canon as valid in meta-science as in science.[1] Facts must be explained, that is to say, welded in a conceptual scheme; and the conception of an independent reality with its own executive order is surely the most economical for explaining these facts. Observers agree in what they see in the laboratory because they are observing the same real object; predictions on the basis of previous observations are fulfilled because the previous observations have revealed the true structure of things. The pragmatic criterion is a rough one at best, since sometimes delusions may work better in practice than true beliefs. But, on the whole, the fact, for instance, that physical theory leads to the construction of machines which work as anticipated, makes it probable that the theory is true.

The objection usually raised against the conception of an ulterior reality is that it is not verifiable in experience. But in

[1] In this paragraph I am elaborating a comment suggested to me by my colleague Professor Donald Williams.

fact, the criteria for confirmation in meta-science need not be the same as in science. Moreover, science itself transcends the boundaries of experience. Science is a prediction of the future, and the future is never an empirical datum. The scientist posits the stream of endless sensations in the future; how does he know that these sensations exist, how does he know that there is a future to worry about and predict?

But although the hypothesis of the future is no more empirical than that of ulterior reality, it must be admitted that it makes less of a wrench with experience than does the hypothesis of an independent matter. Presently unperceived sense-data are of the same *type* as those which are now perceived. But then it is also true that the hypothesis of a phenomenal field infinitely extended in the future fails to explain what needs to be explained—for instance, the very harmoniousness of the future with the past. The appearances through time are similar because, so it seems to me, they are appearances of the same thing. Mr. Conant would, of course, reject the statement that the electron is just as real a thing as the table or the chair. An electron, he would say, is no more than a concept which is fruitful in prediction. Indeed, on his view, both electrons and common-sense objects like tables and chairs disintegrate into an infinity of if-then conditionals. Now, whatever the gain, this is *not* a gain in economy.

I conclude that all three—common sense, science, and philosophy—are engaged in depicting an independent world. In varying ways and degrees, all three employ the test of observation for confirmation of their propositions about this independent world; but their explanatory theories are not *about* the phenomenal field; they are about real things, atoms, electrons, and so on. The interplay, the occasional conflict and the frequent harmony between reality and appearance constitute the moving drama of knowledge.

Theories must change not because the truth is in flux but because the human being is tainted with the original sin of intellectual limitation. This sin must not be projected onto the face of the universe. The enterprise of human inquiry should rest, on the one hand, on a complete respect for reality as it is and on an utmost fidelity in the portrayal of its structure; on the other hand, on the recognition of human intellectual frailty and the consequent probability that our portraits will be inadequate and will have to be retouched or replaced. Such a mixture of hope and despair infects human endeavor in all fields—moral, social, and political, as well as intellectual.

RAPHAEL DEMOS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Humanism versus Theism. J. A. C. Fagginger Auer and Julian Hartt. Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press. 1951. 153 pp. $2.50.

Believing that "searching bears its best fruits when contending philosophies are expounded by their ablest advocates," the Religion Committee of Antioch College in 1948 invited Professor Auer of Harvard Divinity School and Professor Robert L. Calhoun of Yale Divinity School to debate the question "Is Humanism the Religion of the Future?" Their discussions have now been expanded in book form, with Professor Hartt of Yale replacing Professor Calhoun. Both sides are well and vigorously argued, for both advocates are interested in proof on a high level. "The issue is primarily," says Professor Hartt, "though not exclusively, metaphysical. . . . Metaphysics is indispensable to the adequate development of religion and to any significant ethical fragment of religion." Although "everything rides upon the metaphysics of theism," the proofs offered are the traditional list. There are some effective gibes at humanism as "a kind of cosmological isolationism," "inveterately parochial," and so on. Professor Auer wisely contends that "human problems are limited problems and therefore call for limited answers—limited, that is, to the matter under consideration . . . but sufficient for our purposes." Infinite and absolute criteria should not be clamped upon man, for "perfection is no part of humanity. A horse is no less valuable although it cannot fly. The only question is whether men are capable of performing the tasks which they are intended to perform."

Harold A. Larrabee

Union College

Beyond Mythology: A Challenge to Dogmatism in Religion. Richard W. Boynton. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1951. xii, 257 pp. $3.00.

The time may not be far distant when philosophical journals may have to establish a separate department for the reviewing of books by professional philosophers, yet "not intended for the professional philosopher or academic teacher of the subject," but rather for that more numerous species, "the intelligent layman." For such volumes continue to multiply, and Professor Boynton's is one of the best of them. It is a model of lucid, readable, temperate, and yet hard-hitting argument for a point of view that is seriously and earnestly maintained. Even those who disagree with it, and who are even angered by its somewhat dogmatic rejection of their brand of religious dogmatism, will recognize in its author the latest

in a long line of religious protesters against the excesses of religion, and by no means the least vigorous.

Professor Boynton wages relentless war in his pages upon the illusion-building mythologies of fundamentalist religious beliefs, and undertakes "to give a comprehensive account of religion and of Christianity in the setting of a frankly naturalistic philosophy." Yet he stops short of religious humanism, which he regards as "in some respects pre-Copernican" with this world as "the center and almost the circumference of man's existence." His religion without supernaturalism would replace the theological concern about beliefs by a more truly spiritual concern for values, which are, in the author's judgment, the heart of the matter. He holds that it matters profoundly whether or not the claims made in the name of religion are true, and, as a philosopher, boldly rejects a vast number of them in order to clear the ground for more and better values. In his eagerness to exalt secular values and to combat the numbing effects of some religious myths and beliefs, he overstates his case, for there are certainly legitimate connections between such values and some myths and beliefs which he has not explored. What is desperately needed is some criterion of the dramatic or poetic validity of a myth that is reconcilable with the criteria of proof by scientific method, for which Professor Boynton has so much praise.

HAROLD A. LARRABEE
UNION COLLEGE

Christopher Pearse Cranch and His Caricatures of New England Transcendentalism. F. DE WOLFE MILLER. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1951. xi, 81 pp. $2.00.

Christopher Pearse Cranch (1813–1892) was himself one of the Transcendentalists and had a general sympathy with the views they expressed. His poetry was part of the literature of Transcendentalism. His painting, for which he was best known in his own time, was of the Hudson River School of landscape. He wrote a number of children's stories and in the last years of his life was a welcome contributor to *St. Nicholas* and other magazines for children. He was, as Miller says, a "major mediocrity."

In one neglected and undeveloped aspect of his work, however, Cranch transcended his usually thin talents. He had a mordant and irreverent vein of humor which he expressed in excellent caricatures of the Transcendentalist movement, and, in particular, of its high priest, Ralph Waldo Emerson. It was not the ideas of Emerson which Cranch pilloried; it was, rather, the high flown phrases and sentences to which Emerson was addicted. The repro-

duction of a number of these caricatures, "Illustrations of the New Philosophy," is the *raison d'être* of Mr. Miller's little book. Some of Cranch's caricatures are brilliant: Emerson as the "transparent Eyeball" of *Nature;* the Emersonian version of Swedenborg's doctrine of correspondences, "I expand like corn and melons"; the "self-reliance" of the imp-like figure—"This is my music; this is myself" from "The American Scholar"—playing the clarinet—like stops of his prolonged proboscis. Others are more routine. None is completely without interest.

If, beyond the intrinsic interest of the reproductions, this book has a moral, it is that every Emerson should have his Cranch. The world is, as children soon discover, so constituted that the life of a toy balloon is brief. How much more fortunate are those philosophic children whose balloons are destroyed by the sympathetic and gentle pinpricks of friends than those against whose balloons are marshaled the iron lances of enemies.

JOSEPH L. BLAU

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

American Conservatives: The Political Thought of Francis Lieber and John W. Burgess. BERNARD EDWARD BROWN. New York: Columbia University Press. 1951. 191 pp. $2.75.

"Francis Lieber and John W. Burgess both undertook to popularize German philosophy, and to interpret American politics in its terms." This sentence summarizes the principal interest which this double-barreled monograph holds for philosophers. Lieber was a Kantian idealist trained in that tradition of German liberalism which had fought the reactionary nobility and the proletariat in the name of a rising middle class. In America, the feudal nobility being absent, "Lieber, as a liberal, found that he had to fight on the main front—against the proletariat." Burgess first encountered idealism at Amherst under Julius Seelye, and then was swept off his feet by Prussian might and the Hegelians teaching at Berlin just after 1870. "At the core of Burgess' political philosophy lies a pessimistic conception of man, a contempt for the people, and a fear of the things desired by the people through the actions of Government." For years he strove valiantly to make impossible the espousal of socialism by a voting majority. This was to be done by placing property out of the reach of politics by creating a sphere of economic laissez-faire liberty protected by the courts. "His only major convert outside of the legal ranks was apparently Nicholas Murray Butler. . . ."

Lieber deserves to be remembered for his theory of institutional liberty attained through "vibrantly effective institutions which are independent of control by government" acting as shock absorbers. Yet he excluded labor unions, and was sure that agitation for an eight-hour day was "dangerous tampering with immutable laws." Burgess was equally adamant in his opposition to any interference by either labor unions or government in the sacred domain of individual contractual relations between capital and labor. In both conservative thinkers, that is, their philosophical and political insights were largely offset by blind spots, so that it is no wonder that "their influence on American thinking" as well as their "original contributions to political philosophy" were "essentially moderate."

HAROLD A. LARRABEE

UNION COLLEGE

Leviathan and Natural Law. F. LYMAN WINDOLPH. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1951. x, 147 pp. $2.50.

This little book is written in the conviction that "of all political forms democracy most needs an ethical system to support it" (p. 125), and that, accordingly, "we must affirm that the distinctions between good and evil and justice and injustice depend on objective reality" (p. 117). The author is nevertheless convinced of the limited validity of the positivistic tradition in political thought, from Hobbes on. Accordingly, he has made the effort "to induce Leviathan to lie down with the Lamb" (p. vii), that is, "to found a theory of natural law on the basis of positivism" (p. ix). Mr. Windolph is aware that he is dealing with perennial themes, and his treatment of them has a kind of classic simplicity and unpretentiousness about it. Frequently, however, he skirts complicated issues, or seems unaware of the fairly well-known difficulties which some of his proposed solutions raise.

CHARLES FRANKEL

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Leçons de logique formelle. JOSEPH DOPP. Louvain: L'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, E. Nauwelaerts. 1950. 3 vols. $7.00.

This is essentially a textbook, intended for beginning students of formal logic. Volume I is an exposition of traditional formal logic, and covers immediate inference and the categorical syllogism, but not the theory of mixed syllogisms. Volume II supplies a very full treatment of the modern calculus of unanalyzed propositions. It brings together much useful information, and includes proofs of important metalogical theorems: the deduction theorem, the con-

sistency and completeness theorems, and theorems on the independence of primitive statements. Volume III expounds the lower functional calculus, develops the theory of identity on an axiomatic basis, and discusses the theory of descriptions in much detail. A number of metalogical theorems are stated, but proofs are not supplied in all cases. There are also some intimations of the higher functional calculus, of modal logics, and of polyvalent calculi.

ERNEST NAGEL

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Opuscoli inediti. TOMMASO CAMPANELLA. A cura di Luigi Firpo. (Opuscoli Filosofici, vol. 9.) Florence: Leo S. Olschki. 1951. 183 pp. 1500 L.

This is the first post-war volume of the well-known series formerly directed by Gentile, which includes texts and documents of Valla, Pomponazzi, Bruno, and Campanella. The series is now being edited by L. Firpo and E. Garin. The new volume, competently edited by Firpo who is well known as a Campanella expert, contains the following texts: 1 (pp. 7–54): Risposte alle censure dell' "Ateismo Triunfato" (1631). This is a series of objections in Latin, by an anonymous censor, to Campanella's *Atheismus Triumphatus,* with his extensive reply in Italian that touches on several interesting issues. 2 (pp. 55–103): Documenta ad Gallorum nationem (1635). 3 (pp. 105–120): Consultationes aphoristicae (1635). These are two anti-Spanish political pamphlets addressed to the French. 4 (pp. 121–142): Compendium veritatis catholicae . . . de praedestinatione (1637). This is a theological tract on predestination dedicated to Pierre Séguier. Appendix (pp. 143–163): Propositiones censurabiles ex Centone Thomistico (1636). This is another set of objections by an anonymous censor to a work of Campanella. According to the editor's note (pp. 167–176), no. 1 and the appendix were found in the archives of the Inquisition in Rome, the other 3 pieces in the Harleian ms. 4468 of the British Museum. Students of Campanella and of later Renaissance thought will no doubt welcome this new source material which is thus being made available for the first time.

PAUL O. KRISTELLER

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Athens and the Greek Miracle. C. P. RODOCANACHI. Boston: The Beacon Press. 1951. 194 pp. $2.50.

For the cultivated cosmopolite he is, Rodocanachi makes the owl's chauvinist scream rather raucous, and for a good Hellene his

lapses in scholarship are a little shocking, but his book must nevertheless not be too lightly dismissed as the garrulity of a headstrong octogenarian enthusiast. He is sufficiently at home in ancient Athens and surely in modern (but always mainly in the Kolonaki quarter) to make his illumination of one by the other suggestive, assuming that psychology as well as terrain and climate remain constant. His concept of ancient religion is amateurish, even by pre-Victorian standards, yet his analogies throw light on both the cult of the Olympians and that of the Orthodox Church. His main conviction, one gathers, is that the ancient Athenian achievement was due to an aristocratic temperament: this is Athens' principal legacy, and must prevail to secure the salvation of modern Greece. The baronial condescension, consistent throughout, results in some odd views. For example, he thinks Greek tragedy (in which he sees little more than spectacular ritual) was as unintelligible to the mass of its original audience as Latin liturgy is to the mass of Catholic communicants. Such a conclusion, logical by Rodocanachi's premises, unnecessarily vitiates confidence in certain of his more plausible conclusions.

MOSES HADAS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

CURRENT JOURNALS

THE HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. XLIV, No. 1, January 1951. Especially: *A. Owen Aldridge:* Edwards and Hutcheson.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL. Vol. XLIX, No. 3, April 1951. *Viscount Samuel:* What is Happening to Religion To-Day? *Sir S. Radhakrishnan:* Religion and World Unity. *Karl Jaspers:* The Importance of Nietzsche, Marx and Kierkegaard. *M. L. Jacks:* The Education of Good Men. *W. Montgomery Watt:* Islamic Theology and the Christian Theologian. *Gilbert Baker:* China and Christian History. *Peter Munz:* The Devil's Dialectic. *Gilbert Cope:* "The World" in the N. T. *H. S. Shelton:* Jesus: God or Man. *Geo. J. S. King:* The Changes of Half a Century. *F. H. Heinemann and E. L. Allen:* Survey of Recent Philosophical and Theological Literature. *Juan Vázquez:* Philosophy in Latin America.—No. 4, July 1951. *Viscount Samuel:* Does Religion Stand to Reason? *Dean of St. Paul's:* Religion and Religions. *M. Chaning-Pearce:* Christianity's Crucial Conflict. *Sir Wilfrid Garrett:* The Christian Attitude to Economics. *Canon C. E. Raven:* Is There a Christian Politics? *John Macleod:* Theology in Our Era. *N. H. G. Robinson:* Karl Barth's Empiricism. *Con-*

stance I. Smith: Time, Behaviour and Spirit. *R. H. Thouless:* Has Psychology Explained Religion Away? *A. Graham Ikin:* Precognition—Some Implications. *Geoffrey Ashe:* Meaning and Analogy. *F. H. Heinemann and E. L. Allen:* Survey of Recent Philosophical and Theological Literature.

IYYUN. A HEBREW PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY. Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1951. (Articles in Hebrew with English summaries.) *Leon Roth:* Julius Guttmann. *Max Wiener:* Religiosity and Religion. *M. Buber:* Distance and Relation. *Y. Bar-Hillel:* Bolzano's Definition of Analytic Propositions.

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Vol. 18, No. 4, October 1951. *Edwin C. Kemble:* Reality, Measurement, and the State of the System in Quantum Mechanics. *Walter M. Elsasser:* Quantum Mechanics, Amplifying Processes, and Living Matter. *Walter Cerf:* Logical Positivism and Existentialism. *Herbert Spiegelberg:* Supernaturalism or Naturalism: A Study in Meaning and Verifiability.

THE REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS. Vol. V. No. 1, September 1951. *George Bosworth Burch:* The Nature of Life. *Milic Capek:* The Doctrine of Necessity Re-examined. *James K. Feibleman:* The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism. *William M. Walton:* Being, Essence and Existence for St. Thomas Aquinas (II). *Egon Vietta:* Being, World and Understanding: A Commentary on Heidegger.

REVISTA DE FILOSOFÍA. Ministerio de Educación, Universidad Nacional de La Plata. 1951, No. 2. *César E. Pico:* El objeto de la sociología. *Rodolfo M. Agoglia:* La tarea actual de la filosofía. *Juan A. Casaubón:* Crítica del Conceptualismo. *Miguel Federico Sciacca:* Mi punto de vista filosófico.

REVUE DE THÉOLOGIE ET DE PHILOSOPHIE. 1951—I. Especially: *P. Thévenaz:* De la philosophie divine à la philosophie chrétienne.

SAPIENTA. REVISTA TOMISTA DE FILOSOFÍA. Año VI, Núm. 20, 2do. Trimestre, 1951. *Julio M. Ojea Quintana:* Introducción al iusnaturalismo moderno. *Benito Pruche:* Es ateo el existencialismo? *Benito Raffo-Magnasco:* Primera determinación del concepto de bien común en el pensamiento político de Santo Tomás.

"SCIENTIA" (RIVISTA DI SCIENZA). Vol. LXXXVI—(IV–1951). Especially: *G. R. Morrow:* Popular Courts in Plato's Laws.—Vol. LXXXVI—(VII–1951). Especially: *G. Tiercy:* Réformation et transformation progressives des interprétations scientifiques des faits, et questions restées sans réponse.—Vol. LXXXVI—(X–1951). Especially: *B. Thüring:* Logische Betrachtungen zum Energieerhaltungs-satz und zum Perpetuum Mobile. *H. S. Langfeld:* The Development of American Psychology. *M. Mazziotti:* Obbligatorietà delle norme costituzionali.

THOUGHT. FORDHAM UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY. Vol. XXVI, No. 101, Summer 1951. Especially: *Robert C. Pollock:* History Is a Matrix.—No. 102, Autumn 1951. Especially: *Jacques Maritain:* A Maritain Anthology on Art and Poetry; Selected from His Writings. *Thomas Merton:* The Ascent to Truth.

NOTES AND NEWS

Readers of the Journal may notice that beginning with this number there is no list of Book Editors, and a word of explanation is due.

The volume of philosophical publication has increased at such a rate since the war and so many foreign publications are now reaching us that it is impossible for the Editors to give as much space to each book as they would wish to. Accordingly, the Editors have adopted a policy of giving preference to the more important books and publishing more critical reviews and fewer book notes or abstracts. All incoming books will be listed and if they are not to be reviewed an indication of the contents of the book will be given with the listing. But the Journal cannot undertake to publish as many book abstracts as its staff of Book Editors has been providing in the past.

Accordingly, the Editors have been obliged to terminate the appointments of the Journal's Book Editors. The Journal is grateful to this staff for its generous coöperation and services and hopes that in the future reviews from its former Book Editors will continue to appear. At the same time, the Editors take this opportunity to invite its readers to inform them whenever they are especially interested in reviewing a particular book or books in a special field.

On February 20, 1952, the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame will present a symposium on the life and thought of Don Luigi Sturzo.

The particular occasion will be the celebration of Don Sturzo's eightieth birthday, which occurred on November 26, 1951. The more general occasion will be the recognition of Don Sturzo's numerous and varied contributions to diverse fields of learning.

The program will be opened with a short address on Don Sturzo's life and career as scholar and statesman. Reflecting his variety of learned interest and presenting his thought in its different aspects will be papers by members of the faculty of the University on the method of sociology, on political theory, on the history and theory of the relation of Church and State, and on the problems of internationalism.

THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

There is no similar journal in the field of scientific philosophy. It is issued fortnightly and permits the quick publication of short contributions, prompt reviews, timely discussions, notes on new books and other journals, and news of philosophic interest. The last five issues contain:

VOLUME XLVIII

No. 22. October 25, 1951.
Double Number.

Philosophy and Method. RICHARD MCKEON.

The Psychological Surd in Statements of Good and Evil. DONALD A. WELLS.

Review of Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan's *Power and Society* by THOMAS I. COOK.

Review of Kurt Riezler's *Man Mutable and Immutable* by ROBERT CUMMINGS.

No. 23. November 8, 1951.

Whitehead's Denial of Simple Location. WILLIAM P. ALSTON.

How to Resolve Disagreement in "Attitude." JOSEPH KATZ.

Review of Morris T. Keeton's *The Philosophy of Edmund Montgomery* and I. K. Stephens' *The Hermit Philosopher of Liendo* by JOSEPH L. BLAU.

No. 24. November 22, 1951.

Communication and Agreement. CHARLES E. WHITMORE.

A Note on Professor Pepper's Aesthetic Object. NATHAN BERALL.

Comments and Criticism.
Truth or Meaning? VICTOR S. YARROS.

No. 25. December 6, 1951.

Emotive and Existentialist Theories of Ethics. HANS MEYERHOFF.

Avoidability and the Contrary-to-Fact Conditional in C. L. Stevenson and C. I. Lewis. WILLIAM T. FONTAINE.

No. 26. December 20, 1951.

Philosophy and Ordinary Language. D. J. O'CONNOR.

A Postscript on Sense-Data. HENRY W. JOHNSTONE, JR.

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by W. DONALD OLIVER, PH.D., *University of Missouri*

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